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1Of all the regulatory tools available to the FDA in fullling its duties, one of
the most contentious and problematic is its use of adverse publicity. Whether
it is because of its quasi-statutory status, the questionable legality of its often
unregulated use, or its great potential for harm to those it is directed at, there
are many who object to the use of adverse publicity by the FDA. However, one
cannot deny its signicant eectiveness as a regulatory tool and its often
necessary and justied use in protecting the public health and safety. The
purpose of this paper, then, is to explore the FDA's use of adverse publicity and
the issues and conicts that arise as a result.
I. What is Publicity and How is it Used?
First and foremost, it should be made clear what is meant by publicity. The
term
publicity is reserved for statements which invite public attention and which
may adversely aect individuals identied therein.' This means that it is limited
to armative issuance of publicity
'Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R. x305.73-1, Ad-
verse Agency Publicity (1973).
|
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2by the FDA. Disclosing facts or records requested by an individual under federal
information disclosure statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act is not
included. This also excludes routine agency lists of enforcement actions or
decisions that the FDA is mandated to publish,2 such as the FDA's weekly
recall lists.3
The FDA uses a variety of channels for publicity. It issues press releases
and public announcements and warnings, and utilizes formal press conferences,
briengs, interviews, speeches, individual letters, and other forums.4 Published
reports and announcements also appear in the FDA Consumer, the FDA En-
forcement Report, the Federal Register and other private journals.5
Although the FDA may issue press releases and announcements for vari-
ous reasons in various situations, its use of adverse publicity is most often in
connection with product recalls. Firstly, publicity from the FDA, and even
the manufacturer, may be necessary to recover and warn the public against
hazardous products subject to recall. Publicity is the only eective means of
removing and notifying the public of products that have gotten past the recall,
have already been distributed by the manufacturer, are in the market, and per-
haps already in the hands of the consumer. A dramatic public warning by the
FDA is the only way to limit or halt
221 U.S.C. x375
3One commentator has also noted, though, that issuance of recall lists is
problematic for its own reasons. For example, the list of products is often out-
of-date, appearing so long after the event that it gives the impression that there
is a second separate problem with the product. Also, they fail to distinguish
between actual recalls and stock checks or eld corrections. See Richard S.
Morey, Publicity as a Regulatory Tool, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L. J 469, 470
(1975).
4U. Hui, United States Food Laws, Regulations and Standards, 478-79 (1979).
51d
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3consumption before it is too late. This is assuming, of course, that the man-
ufacturer has agreed to the FDA' s recall request, as the FDA currently does
not have the statutory power to order recalls. Secondly, if a manufacturer does
not agree to the FDA's recall request, the FDA may decide to use the threat of
adverse publicity to persuade the company to comply and recall its product, in
addition to its supplemental use as a general warning to the public.
II. Statutory Authority for the Use of Publicity
The FDA is one of the few federal agencies in government which is specically
required and authorized by law to use publicity. This is provided by Section
705 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C) of 1938,6 7which reads:
Sec. 705. (a) The Secretary shall cause to be published from time to time
reports summarizing all judgments, decrees, and court orders which have been
rendered under this Act, including the nature of the charge and the disposition
thereof.
(b) The Secretary may also cause to be disseminated information regarding
food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics in situations involving, in the opinion of the
Secretary, imminent danger to health, or gross deception of the consumer. Noth-
ing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the Secretary from collecting,
reporting, and illustrating the results of the investigations of the Department.
[emphasis added]
621 U.S.C. x375.
71n addition to Section 705 of the FD&C Act, the FDA, under delegation of
authority of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, may issue publicity
under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (15 U.S.C. x 1272) concerning
products which constitute a danger to health. Section 13 of the Hazardous
Substances Act is nearly identical to Section 705 of the FD&C Act. In addition,
the Oce of Product Safety, the division of the FDA which is charged with
the enforcement of the Hazardous Substances Act, may publish in the Federal
Register, without a prior hearing, notice that particular products constitute an
imminent danger to public health and that such products are banned hazardous
substances (15 U.S.C. x1261(q)(2)).
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4The rst paragraph of Section 705 is rather clear and straightforward in its
purpose. It directs and requires the Secretary to publish reports summarizing
judgments, decrees, and orders in each case brought under the Act. These are
the familiar Notices of Judgment.
It is under Section 705(b), however, that controversy necessarily arises. Be-
sides authorizing the Secretary to report its investigations, the paragraph clearly
allows the FDA to direct publicity at specic foods, drugs, cosmetics, and medi-
cal devices, but only in situations which, in the opinion of the Secretary, involve
imminent danger to health or gross deception of the consumer. The question is
and remains whether the FDA has followed these seemingly high standards, or
has overstepped its bounds and employed publicity beyond the certain situations
in which there is a need for such a powerful sanctioning tool.
Publicity, some argue, was never intended to be used routinely or lightly by
the Agency for relatively trivial problems, situations where there is no justica-
tion for armative publicity in terms of the public's need to know, no imminent
danger~~ or gross deception. One commentator, for example, points out an in-
cident of the unjustied use of publicity by the FDA, involving a Class III recall
of 15,000 candy bars for rancidity.8 A Class III recall is dened as a routine
situation in which the consequences to life (if any) are remote or non-existent.
The well-known manufacturer agreed to recall its product because the bars had
developed a slight o-taste that did not pose a health hazard. Nevertheless, the
FDA still decided to publicize the incident, which was even reported in the Wall
Street Journal, undoubtedly causing a not insignicant amount of injury to the
manufacturer's reputation and nancial worth.
8See Richard S. Morey, Publicity as a Regulatory Tool, 30 Food Drug Cosm.
L. $ 469,
470 (1975).
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5Ultimately, it comes down to an insoluble issue of judgment, prediction, and
degrees. Because of the inherent uncertainty involved in dealing with food,
drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, etc., there will always be disagreement as
to how imminent a danger really is, or whether or not a practice is a gross
deception on the part of the manufacturer. This may be why the statute leaves
the determination to the FDA and the opinion of the Secretary.
III. Judicial Interpretation of the Authority for. Extent of. and Limits on the FDA's Use of
Publicity
One of the rst cases to address the FDA's use of publicity was Hoxsey Can-
cer Clinic, Inc. v. Folsom,9 in which plaintis attempted to enjoin the FDA's
dissemination of posters that warned the public that the so-called Hoxsey
cancer treatment was worthless.'0 The court essentially upheld the FDA's use
of publicity as constitutional, against claims that it was a denial of due process,
even though it does not provide for any notice or hearing before publicity is
issued. More importantly, the court suggests that the FDA actually has an
implied authority to use publicity because of the nature of its regulatory duties.
Even in the absence of this statute [Section 705 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act] there would be nothing to prevent the defendants from disseminating in-
formation to the public....The defendants [FDA] are performing a public duty
when they are urging the use of certain treatments or warning the public against
the use of certain treatments. The only purpose of this statute is to place within
the express scope of
~l55 F. Supp. 376 (D. D.C. 1957).
~ s warning against the Hoxsey cancer treatment was, at the time, the most
widely circulated warning ever issued by the FDA. As reported by Wallace F.
Janssen (Director of FDA Public-Information Activities), Public Information
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act | IV, 12 Food Drug Cosm. L. ii 566,
576 (1957).
-5-
6the duties of the Secretary something that was one of his implied functions.
Thus, the court armed the use of publicity by the FDA as both constitutional
and an inherent part of its authority.
The FDA, however, has been chastised by the courts for inappropriate use of
publicity. For instance, in the case of United States v. Abbott Laboratories,'2 the
FDA released prejudicial pre-trial publicity in the form of a press release naming
Abbot Laboratories and associating fty blood poisoning deaths with the use of
Abbott intravenous solutions, even after Abbot had issued a nationwide recall of
its solutions two months earlier. The court accepted without question, that the
pretrial publicity in this case was prejudicial and highly inammatory.'3 It had
even more harsh words for the FDA: Irrespective of the outcome of this case,
we join in the district court's condemnation of this conduct and express our
strongest disapproval that highly placed legal ocers would make a statement
of this import with regard to a pending criminal prosecution, and even more so
that FDA, which had [already] referred the matter to the Department of Justice,
would issue a press release containing such prejudicial material.'4 Nonetheless,
even though the court recognized the impropriety of the FDA's publicity, it
still refused to dismiss the indictment against Abbott, since voir dire and other
procedures were still available to assure a fair trial. Additionally, we must
remember that, in this case, the s publicity was ruled inappropriate mainly
because it was prejudicial to the pending trial, and not
155 F. Supp. at 378.
12505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974).
'31d. at 570.
'41d at 571.
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7because it was unjustied or unnecessary (though the fact that Abbott's prod-
ucts had already been recalled months earlier, and the matter had already
been turned over to the Department of Justice, were undoubtedly factors in
the court's decision). Thus, the case does not necessarily shed much light on
the limits of the FDA's 'justied use of publicity, though it demonstrates that
courts do recognize limits to the FDA's use of publicity.
Another court, however, actually did explicitly recognize, for the rst time,
the limitations placed on the FDA by Section 705(b). The case of United States
v. International Medication Systems, Ltd (IMS)'5 initially involved an action
by the FDA for preliminary and permanent injunction against IMS, charging a
number of violations of the FD&C Act, including failure of the IMS plant to
comply with current good manufacturing practice (GMP) requirements. During
a period of evidentiary hearings, FDA representatives met with IMS, requested
that IMS recall its products, and indicated that if the request were refused, the
FDA would inform the nation s hospitals that a public health hazard was pre-
sented by IMS products because of the alleged GMP violations. IMS, though,
refused this demand because it felt it was unjustied and involved essentially the
same issues already before the court in Los Angeles in the pending case. Con-
sequently, on June 9, 1973, the FDA sent a letter to the nation's approximately
7,000 hospitals, stating that the sterility of IMS units was compromised and
claiming that the products presented a potential hazard to public health. Ulti-
mately, the court not only denied the FDA's motions for injunction but, more
importantly, found that the FDA had violated Section 705(b) of the FD&C
Act and overstepped its publicity authority in sending its letter to the nation's
hospitals. Additionally, the court even ordered that the FDA issue corrective
publicity in the
'5Civ. No. 73-626-WPG (CD Cal. 1973), ad, No. 73-3260 (9th Cir. 1974).
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8form of a second letter to the same hospitals, reporting the court's ruling and the
specic nding by the court that IMS was not shown to be guilty of violation
of good manufacturing practices to the extent that its products represent a
potential hazard to the public health.'6 17 Thus, the International Medication
case is signicant as the rst instance in which courts have recognized that
there are unjustied or inappropriate uses of publicity by the FDA that violate
the standards set in Section 705(b). Just as signicant is its holding that a
manufacturer or company may be entitled to relief in the form of corrective
publicity issued by the FDA to remedy the harm done by earlier, unjustied,
adverse publicity.
Furthermore, the courts have ruled that they do have the power to restrict
and enjoin the FDA from issuing news releases and other public statements, par-
ticularly when it is pre-trial publicity in connection with a regulatory action.
As the court in US. v. An Article of Device.... Diapulse Manufacturing Cor-
poration ofAmerica'8 stated, a United States Court undoubtedly has inherent
power | indeed, is under a plain duty | to take whatever action may be nec-
essary and appropriate to assure a fair trial, regardless of how the proceedings
are labeled:
criminal, civil, admiralty or otherwise. The assurance of a fair trial includes
safeguarding against prejudicial pre-trial publicity, regardless of the type of
action.'9 However, despite this
'6Cited in Morey, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L. I at 476.
'7Following this ruling by the court, however, the FDA and IMS reached an
agreement under which IMS withdrew its request for relief under Section 705.
Therefore, the court's nal written order only denied the FDA's motions for
injunction and did not contain the corrective publicity relief/order contemplated
in the court's oral statement on June 15, 1973.
18262 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1967).
'91d at 730
-8-
9armation of the courts' inherent power over particular FDA publicity, the Di-
apulse court ultimately did not use this power in its particular case. Instead, it
deferred to the FDA's 'justied use of publicity as part of performing its duties.
As the court again stated, the instant case is a striking example....of a situation
where it would be most inappropriate for the federal judiciary | under the guise
of exercising its undoubted power to safeguard parties to a pending proceeding
against prejudicial pre-trial publicity | to attempt to muzzle an agency of the
executive branch of the government in performing a duty expressly entrusted
to it by Congress in 21 U.S.C. x375(b), including the dissemination of infor-
mation and reporting the results of investigation. 20 The court found that the
statements made by the FDA concerning the Diapulse case were factual state-
ments of claims in no way prejudicial to claimant, and reect a commendable
performance by the FDA of a public duty imposed by Congress in disseminating
information... [and] warning 'the public against the use of certain treatments.'
[citation omitted]22 In addition, the court found that Diapulse had failed to
establish any irreparable injury or any threat thereof.23 Therefore, although it
appears that courts have the power to
20I~
21The statements made by the FDA consisted of two pages in the Mar. 1966
Report On Enforcement And Compliance that were devoted to the Diapulse
case, containing a reasonably factual summary of the claims of the parties (262
F.Supp. at 729); and two sentences in a speech by the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs, Dr. James L. Goddard, to the Congress of Medical Quackery on Oct. 7,
1966: You probably know of the 'Diapulse' case. This device, seized in Atlanta,
Georgia, used electrical impulses to supposedly treat arthritis, hypertension, si-
nusitis, middle ear infections, TB, syphilis, toxemia, asthma, hepatitis, diabetes,
gangrene, pneumonia, and other conditions.~~
22262 F.Supp. at 730.
23Id
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10enjoin certain publicity by the FDA, they may be hesitant to do so when the
agency is ostensibly doing its public duty and the aected party lacks any hard
evidence of irreparable harm or injury.
IV. FDA Policy Toward the Use of Publicity
Ultimately, the FDA is still strongly devoted to, and values above all, the
safety and health of the public. The regulated industry must realize that the
FDA will rely on any and all of its varied enforcement tools in protecting the
public health,24 including, of course, publicity. In defense of its actions during
the 1959 cranberry scare,25 in which millions of dollars worth of cranberries were
unsold because of erroneous FDA publicity, the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare explained that a responsible government....cannot fail to place at
the top of its list of priorities the health of all of the people, even though by
doing so it may be or may appear to be acting against the economic interests of
a segment of our society.26 In addition, the FDA and certain ocers have held
the view that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a "constitution" as opposed
to a grant of power which must be narrowly and strictly construed. Thus, their
position may be that the agency has the authority to do anything that Congress
has not
24Marie A. Urban, The FDA's Policy on Seizures, Injunctions, Civil Fines,
and Recalls,
47 Food & Drug L.Ji 411, 411(1992). Marie A. Urban is Director, Division
of Compliance
Management and Operations, Oce of Enforcement/Regulatory Aairs, Food
and Drug
Administration.
25Discussed more fully in the later section on the eects of FDA publicity,
infra.
26Testimony of Arthur Flemming, Hearings before the Subcommittee on De-
partments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare and Related Agencies of
the House Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 165-190, 168-171
(1960).
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11prohibited it from doing in advance, including the virtually unregulated use of
publicity. It appears, then, that the policy of the FDA is that it will use any
and all of its regulatory tools, including publicity, in its mission to protect the
public, despite possible adverse consequences to those aected.
Nevertheless, the FDA, in an ocial announcement describing its publicity
policy and outlining proposed publicity regulations27 recognized and concurred
with many Administrative Conference recommendations that actually put lim-
its on the agency's use of publicity.28 For example, it agreed that personally
disparaging or gratuitously critical remarks, not required in reporting the facts
of a situation, should be and will be avoided, and the FDA recognized that
advance notice of FDA's plans to seek publicity that may be adverse is appro-
priate....to enable aected persons to make a timely response of their own to the
press. In addition, it concurred with the recommendation that would require a
retraction or correction of erroneous or misleading adverse agency publicity if
an aected person requested it. Of course, the FDA also made sure to restate its
position that it will continue to seek publicity, when appropriate, even if there
is the possibility that the information may be ignored, misinterpreted, oversim-
plied, overstated, or misunderstood by the media or by the public. Still, it
is signicant that the FDA actually agreed to recommendations and proposed
regulations that limited its own use of publicity.
Unfortunately, despite the s apparent agreement with many of the Admin-
istrative
2742 FR 12436 (Mar. 4, 1977).
28The U.S. Administrative Conference, in response to several ill-advised pub-
licity incidents, adopted recommendations respecting the use of publicity by
regulatory agencies. See Recommendation 73-1: Adverse Agency Publicity, 38
FR 16839 (June 27, 1973). The Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare responded to the Conference's recommendations by adopting regulations
codied at 45 C.F.R. Part 17.
|
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12Conference's recommendations to improve publicity and its willingness to pro-
pose new regulations29 based on these recommendations, the proposed regula-
tions were never nalized. The FDA ocially withdrew these proposed rules
specifying FDA publicity policy on December 30, 1991.30 As the FDA explained,
these proposed rules on publicity policy, as part of a larger group of pre-1986 pro-
posed rules, no longer reect the agency's regulatory objectives or priorities.3'
This action was partly in response to criticism that the agency's backlog of
pending proposals dilutes the agency's ability to concentrate its attention on
higher priority regulations mandated by statute or necessary to protect public
health.32 Apparently, then, publicity policy and a revision in the FDA's public-
ity practices and regulations is no longer of high priority to the FDA. In essence,
these proposed rules have become outdated, perhaps necessarily so, due to the
increasing scope of duties relegated to the FDA and its concurrently decreasing
abilities and resources. As the FDA admits, because of the agency's limited
resources and changing priorities, FDA has been unable to consider, in a timely
manner, the issues raised by....these proposals and either complete the rulemak-
ing or withdraw the proposals. In many cases, it is unlikely that the agency
will have an opportunity to consider these issues in the foreseeable future...the
agency believes that the public interest is best served by withdrawing
2942 FR 12436 (March 4, 1977).
3056 FR 67440 (December 30, 1991).
311d. at 67440.
32Id
-12-
13these pre-1986 proposed rules.33 Finally, the FDA oers a further, and ironic,
justication for its withdrawal of these proposals. This action would eliminate
the uncertainty that may be
presented by the fact that the agency has not issued nal rules based on
these proposals. This uncertainty may inhibit agency or private sector action
to resolve issues by means other than
those set out in the agency's proposed rule. The agency also believes that
public condence in the agency's processes is undermined when the agency
initiates, but does not complete, a
rulemaking proposal and fails to give public notice that it does not intend
to issue a nal rule.34 Of course, this uncertainty and lack of public condence
was created by the agency itself by not following through with its own proposals
in the rst place. Furthermore, in the specic case of FDA use of publicity, the
withdrawal of proposed regulations/policy, instead of eliminating
uncertainty, may simply revert the situation back to the pre-proposal state
of uncertainty, where the FDA's policy on publicity was even more unclear and
without guidelines.
In fact, the withdrawal of the proposed rules on agency publicity is, practi-
cally speaking, advantageous to the FDA. The uncertainly and lack of binding
regulations on their use of
publicity provides the agency with the exibility and discretion that they
prefer and need. The concept of exibility is important to industry and to con-
sumers because the FDA must be able to deal with circumstances individually
if it is to carry out its basic mission of consumer
protection.35 Whether or not this was a signicant factor in the FDA's de-
cision to withdraw the
~~56 FR 42668, 42668 (August 28, 1991).
34Id.
35Wayne L. Pines (Deputy Asst. Commissioner for Public Aairs of the
FDA), Regulatory Letters, Publicity and Recalls, 31 Food Drug Cosm. L. Ii
352, 359 (1976).
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14proposed regulations from consideration, or whether their true concerns lie with
backlog, limited resources, and higher priority problems, is unclear. Whatever
the case, the FDA currently has no spec~c agency policy toward its use of
publicity, has withdrawn its proposed regulations, and has no immediate plans
for proposing or adopting new regulations.
V. Detrimental Eects of FDA Publicity
Given the quasi-statutory and often questionable legal status of the FDA's
use of publicity, the relative rarity of courts imposing eective limitations on its
use, and the lack of solid, self-imposed agency restrictions or even guiding policy,
the agency's almost discretionary use of publicity has a considerable potential
for harmful eects.
Publicity, in general, is almost inherently damning, especially to one's rep-
utation, as it usually comes without any notice and without adequate time for
response or rebuttal. As the Supreme Court recognized early on, the injuries
which are done to character and reputation seldom can be cured, and the most
innocent man may in a moment be deprived of his good name, upon which,
perhaps, he depends for all the prosperity, and all the happiness of life....Nor
can it be fairly said, that the same opportunity is given to vindicate, which has
been employed to defame him, for many will read the charge who may never see
the answer.. 36 The very characteristics that recommend the use of publicity
to the FDA | ecient distribution, saving on agency labor, speed | assure
that companies will not be able to stop the publicity once it has left the agency.
Once the word is out, the harm has been done. Even if the company is success-
ful in defending against false allegations, it is too little, too late. Exoneration
rarely
36Respublica v. Oswald, 1 US (1 Dall) 318 (1788).
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15commands the same public attention as a charge of wrongdoing.37 Of course,
the temporary and perhaps permanent destruction of the consumer market for
a particular product, induced by adverse FDA publicity, goes without saying.
Moreover, besides the direct injury and harm to the manufacturer's repu-
tation and product market from FDA publicity, the publicity itself may lead
to other, indirect, and perhaps more damaging results. Consider, for example,
the eect that constant but trivial and unjustied FDA-issued publicity has on
the consumer. He or she can become desensitized and jaded by these minor
announcements and not be prepared to act in the case of a real health or safety
emergency. Moreover, when rash and imprudent announcements (or denounce-
ments) by the FDA are later discovered to be erroneous, this hurts the agency's
credibility with the consumer and, again, the consumer may not fully trust,
appreciate, or heed a future FDA waming in a truly critical situation.
Furthermore, adverse FDA press releases on a particular product, because of
their ocial source, may key the media into another topic for consumer scare sto-
ries and serve as fodder for sensationalism. This added publicity/sensationalism
can dramatically increase litigation and cripple companies. Take the Dalkon
Shield and asbestos as examples. The number of claims against the A.H. Robins
Company for alleged harm associated with the Dalkon Shield increased exponen-
tially after the media started reporting the cases. The publicity and increased
litigation generated a caseload that was too much for the company, and it ulti-
mately
37Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. 477, 479 (D. D.C. 1980). See also
GTE Sylvania v. CPSC, Inc., 447 US 102 (1980).
-15-
16led for bankruptcy.38 Also, the fantastic number of asbestos cases now before
federal and state courts | over 60,000 in state courts and 26,000 before one
federal judge in Philadelphia | is directly related to secondary publicity by the
media.39
There are other secondary eects as well. The FDA's publicity does not
necessarily aect only the single manufacturer or product that it is directed
at, but will adversely impact the manufacturer's or product's industry as a
whole. As a result, companies innocent of any wrongdoing may suer serious
economic loss because the FDA's adverse publicity cannot be focused only on
the wrongdoers.
Additionally, publicity will aect a publicly-traded company's nancial sta-
tus when it ultimately hits Wall Street. It will also have an eect on a company's
internal operations as employees learn about the FDA's allegations and state-
ments and react accordingly. Large customers such as drug wholesalers and
food chains may start rejecting the product in anticipation of expected con-
sumer reaction against it. Finally, with drug or medical companies, the eect
on physicians and pharmacists must be considered. Obviously, these middlemen
will have to decide whether or not to prescribe the products in question as well
as how to respond to patients' inquiries about them. The fear of malpractice
claims may force them to cease using, recommending, or prescribing the prod-
uct, even if they personally believe in the product's safety and eectiveness. In
addition, when competing products are on the market, it is likely that compet-
ing manufacturers or sales representatives will exploit the situation and further
mention
385ee Wayne L. Pines, Communications Strategies in Product Liability Crises,
48 Food &DrugL.J. 153, 154 (1993).
39Id
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17the FDA's adverse publicity to physicians, pharmacists, and other potential
customers. Perhaps what is most disturbing about the FDA's use of publicity
as a regulatory tool is
not just its potential for harm and companies' helplessness in the face of
it, but, because of these aspects, how it may force companies to act and sur-
render when they are, in fact, innocent of wrongdoing. Damaging publicity
is often a greater threat to many agency respondents than any ocial agency
sanction.40 As a result, it may coerce potential victims into accepting even the
most questionable agency views and demands, which, as a result, are never re-
viewed by the courts. The International Medication Systems case, supra, has
already given us an example of the somewhat coercive use of publicity by the
FDA. According to a leading study, four factors determine the coercive eects of
agency publicity: 1) the likelihood that adverse publicity will reach the public,
2) the degree to which the public disapproves of the conduct being condemned,
3) the importance of a good reputation to the one against whom the publicity
is directed, and 4) the extent to which adverse public impact will deter others
in their conduct, beyond the subject company's activities.4' By this analysis,
FDA publicity may be quite coercive: It is very likely that the FDA's adverse
publicity will reach the public, not only because of the many publicity channels
available to the FDA, but because the subject matter, potential health risks
and dangers (some fatal) in our food, drugs, or medical devices, is inherently of
(self)interest to the public and media. Of course, this also means that the pub-
lic disapproves (to say the least) of the conduct that the FDA is condemning,
usually the continued manufacture and marketing of unsafe
40Note, Disparaging Publicity by Federal Agencies, 67 Col. L. R. 1512, 1514
(1967).
41Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
1380, 1383 (1973).
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18products. In addition, a good reputation is vital to the success of a manufac-
turer, or any marketer of products, especially in the case of food, drug, and med-
ical device companies. Finally, adverse publicity from the FDA and its eects
on companies do serve as a deterrent example to other companies. Therefore,
FDA use of publicity may be seen as extremely, and perhaps inappropriately,
coercive.~~
VI. The Cranberry Scare
Perhaps the most (in)famous incident involving FDA publicity, and the clear-
est example of the potential impact of its unfortunate use, was the cranberry
scare of 1 95942 Shortly before Thanksgiving of 1959, just as the peak season
for cranberries sales in the nation began, the FDA discovered that aminoth-
iazole, a pesticide which in very high doses had been shown to induce cancer
in rats, had been sprayed on cranberries grown in Washington and Oregon.
Cranberries grown in the rest of the United States were not involved, and it
ultimately turned out that less than one percent of the nation's cranberry crop
was exposed to any aminothiazole hazard. Also, scientists considered that the
likelihood of harm from the contaminated cranberries was, at most, specula-
tive, since only low-level, short-term exposure was involved.43 Nevertheless, on
November 9, 1959, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Arthur Flem-
ming held a highly publicized press conference in which he urged the public not
to eat the contaminated cranberries. Of course, the eect of this FDA publicity
was to decimate the entire
425ee Morey, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L. Ji at 471-72, and Edward L. Smith,
The Cranberry Scare and Cabinet Immunity, 16 Food Drug Cosm. L. ii 209,
209-210 (1961).
43Morey, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L..1. at 472.
-18-
19national market for cranberries in 1959. The cranberry producers' association
reported that retail sales dropped 67 percent from Thanksgiving sales in previ-
ous years.44 Many innocent and non-contaminated cranberry growers suered
serious economic loss because the adverse publicity could not be focused only
on those cranberries and growers that were contaminated. There remained a
lingering eect on the market for years afterward, although there was no longer
any aminothiazole hazard. The incident generated protests from growers, the
New York Times,45 and even the American Medical Association.46 Congress
eventually indemnied cranberry growers for their losses in the amount of ap-
proximately ten million dollars.47
VII. Options and Remedies Against FDA Publicity
Unfortunately, the fact of the matter is that, in the face of signicant poten-
tial or actual harm, aected companies have few eective options or remedies
against FDA publicity.
Firstly, and surprisingly, it may be unwise for the manufacturer or company
in question to respond to FDA allegations or statements. In considering whether
and how to respond, the aected party must keep in mind the credibility of the
person or organization making the allegations or statements, in this case the
FDA. Usually, when allegations are made, it makes sense, as a countermeasure,
to rebut, deny, or clarify them in the press with a follow-up release or
44Statement by Ambrose E. Stevens, executive vice president, National Cran-
berry Institute, in Washington, D.C., quoted in Associated Press dispatch, De-
cember 9, 1959.
45New York Times, November 14, 1959, p. 20, col. 2.
46American Medical Association Journal, January 2, 1960, p. 62.
47New York Times, March 31, 1960, p. 1, col. 8.
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20announcement of some sort, so that false allegations or statements do not stand
unchallenged. Repeated long enough, allegations, false or otherwise, will be
believed unless they are rebutted. Moreover, allegations, if not rebutted, will
remain in newspaper stories forever, available to future reporters interested in
later litigation or anyone interested in researching the product or company in
question. However, in the case of FDA publicity, the option of responding to
statements or allegations may not be available to manufacturers or companies.
That is, considering the status and credibility of the FDA, it may not be wise
to confront them in public.48 The Food and Drug Administration has great
credibility and authority with the media and the public. Therefore, it carries
the presumption of objectivity. On the other hand, and unfortunately, no one
has less credibility than the company being attacked, as the public presumes
they have ulterior motives of self-interest. Arguing with the FDA in public may
be futile and can actually further damage a company or product's reputation.
Therefore, a public response to FDA publicity by an aected company is a risky
option.
An alternative option or remedy may be to seek an order requiring the FDA
to issue corrective publicity, as was the case in United States v. International
Medication Systems49 (supra). However, one must remember that this, as with
many other potential remedies against FDA publicity, is a rare accomplishment.
Moreover, corrective publicity from the FDA may be a useless gesture: the
damage has already been done, and the correction comes too little, too late. As
mentioned previously, exoneration rarely commands the same public attention
as a charge of
485ee Wayne L. Pines, Communications Strategies in Product Liability Crises,
48 Food &DrugL.J 153, 156 (1993).
49Civ. No. 73-626-WPG (CD Cal. 1973), ad, No. 73-3260 (9th Cir. 1974).
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21wrongdoing.50
Aected companies may also consider an injunction or temporary restrain-
ing order to stop the further dissemination of any information or publicity by
the FDA. As mentioned earlier, courts have asserted the power of injunction
against the FDA.5' However, it seems that they may often be hesitant in using
it, since they recognize that the FDA may be doing its public duty in dis-
seminating information and publicity, and do not want to interfere and muzzle
an agency of the executive branch.52 There are also constitutional concerns
involved, including the presumption against prior restraint and the conict be-
tween constitutional/publication liberties and private rights.
Consequently, there are strict requirements or factors that must be met
before an injunction will issue, requirements which make it dicult for the
aected company to prevail. For instance, the aected company or manufac-
turer must demonstrate that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is
not granted. This can be done through adavits of marketing personnel,53 but
injury may have to be economic, immediate, and devastating, which may be dif-
cult to prove for some companies, especially less well-established ones in less
well-established industries. In addition, the impact of the injunction on other
interested persons will have to be shown; that is, that other similarly situated
manufacturers would not be greatly disadvantaged by the injunction should it
be granted, or that persons with a demonstrably
50Rushfordv. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. 477, 479 (D. D.C. 1980).
5'See US. v....Diapulse, 262 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1967), supra.
521d
535ee, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F.Supp. 1047
(D. Del 1976).
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22legitimate interest in the information will not be deprived of information impor-
tant to them. Perhaps most importantly, an injunction will not issue if public
interest in informing the public of the problem or product is so great that it
overrides and overweighs the other factors; for instance, if the public will be
exposed to an additional and signicant adverse eect during the time the in-
junction is in eect and the product is still on the market for sale or use. This
is the most dicult hurdle to get past, as it is the FDA's mission to the protect
the public health and safety. Ultimately, one must remember that an injunction
is a drastic and hard-to-obtain remedy, especially against a federal agency such
as the FDA. As the previous cases have shown, they are rarely granted.
Similarly, post-disclosure remedies for recovery of damages caused by FDA
publicity are virtually non-existent. Persons who suer damages as a result of
an administrative act have two possible sources of recovery or compensation:
the government ocial whose act caused the injury, or the government itself.54
Under present law, however, both sources are immune.
Ocials, including the Secretary, are immune from damages for injuries
caused by adverse FDA publicity. In the landmark case of Spalding v. Vilas,55
the Supreme Court ruled that cabinet ocers are not liable for defamation in
their ocial communications....in the discharge of duties imposed upon them
by law.56 Otherwise, eective administration would be seriously hampered by
ocers' constant fear of liability. Spalding was the basis for a long line of federal
54Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative Law, p. 208 (1958).
161 U.S. 483 (1896).
561d at 498.
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23decisions that extended this immunity to federal ocials below the cabinet of-
cer level.57 Finally, in Barr v. Mateo,58 the Supreme Court held that gov-
ernment ocials have immunity from any tort liability that results from action
taken in the exercise of their ocial responsibilities.59 Thus, as long as an FDA
ocial is acting within the scope of his authority |a requirement which has
been construed broadly in favor of ocials | he or she is protected by an
absolute privilege against suit.60
In addition, the government itself is immune from a suit for damages under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.6' For example, if a manufacturer is found innocent
of an agency charge or allegation but has suered irreparable injury because of
the adverse publicity, it may not recover damages against the government/FDA.
While the Federal Tort Claims Act allows suits for the negligent and wrongful
acts of the government, it expressly exempts actions based on claims arising
from libel, slander, or misrepresentation. In fact, the immunity provided by the
Federal Tort Claims Act covers actions done in executing a statute or regulation,
even if it is invalid, or
57Cases are collected in Handler and Klein, Defense of Privilege in Defama-
tion Suits Against Government Executive Ocials, 74 Harvard Law Review 44
(1960).
58360 U.S. 564 (1959).
590ne judge has argued that this provision of immunity may have unwit-
tingly created a privilege so extensive as to be almost unlimited and altogether
subversive of the fundamental principle that no man in this country is so high
that he is above the law. Concurring opinion of Chief Justice Groner, Glass v.
Ickes, 117 F.2d 273, (CA of DC, 1940). See also the dissent of Brennan, J. in
Barr v. Mateo.
60Besides, a suit against an FDA ocial is mostly futile, as an individual
ocial will not be a good source of monetary compensation for one's damages,
as opposed to the government itself.
6128 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1964).
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24for acts within any federal agency's discretionary function or duty....whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.62 Clearly, then, even questionable or
perhaps unjustied use of publicity by the FDA may be covered by the Act,
thereby making the FDA/government immune.
However, a potential, though rare, way to defeat governmental immunity is
to secure the passing of a private bill through the Congress, one that permits
the waiver of sovereign immunity for a particular suit. This was the case in
Mizokami v. United States,63 where farmers sued for the destruction of their
1962 market for summer spinach by erroneous FDA reports of pesticide contam-
ination. As the injured farmers proved in the Court of Claims, news travels fast
in the produce business and....the overall eect of the stoppages and erroneous
determination was to depress their business and force price cuts64 for the re-
maining crop. By securing the passage of a private bill, the farmers were able to
recover more than $300,000. Of course, the success of such a method or option
would require considerable inuence in Congress on behalf of the manufacturer
or industry in question.
One case, however, has suggested the intriguing idea that perhaps the FDA
(or, more precisely, the government) has a moral obligation to recompense the
losses suered by the manufacturer/producer from erroneous, adverse publicity
from the FDA. The court in California Canners & Growers Assoc. v. U 8.65
held that the plainti, a manufacturer of products containing cyclamates, could
recover for losses sustained as a result of consumer response to the FDA's
6228 U.S.C. x2680(a) (1952).
63414 F.2d 1375 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
64I~ at 1381.
657 Cl. Ct. 69 (United States Claims Court, 1984)
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25erroneous announcement that cyclamates had been found to have caused can-
cer when ingested by laboratory animals. Cyclamates had not been found to
have caused cancer | only the test substance of cyclamates and saccharin had
been found to be a carcinogen. The agency's statements were clearly erroneous
and wholly lacking in support.66 Of course, sales dropped suddenly and dra-
matically immediately after the Government's statements.67 In its reasoning for
holding the Government responsible for the manufacturer's losses, the court did
recognize that it is in the public interest and to the public's benet that the
Government [FDA] engage in such publicity to keep consumers advised of sci-
entic and medical developments and questions concerning a product's safety.68
However, the court still decided in favor of the manufacturer:
The marketers of any product should not, in all justice and fairness, be
forced to sustain and absorb the losses incurred as a result of erroneous Govern-
ment statements, particularly those which are wholly unwarranted and carelessly
issued.69 In fact, even though the events in this case would not give rise to any
legal claim if brought against a private party, the court still allowed a recovery
against the Government, based on an equitable claim, recognizing the moral
obligation of the United States.70 [emphasis added] That is, Plainti should be
compensated
661d at 91.
67Id at 92.
681d
691d
701d
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26for these losses as an equitable claim based on the moral obligation of the United
States.7' Thus, the court recognizes that the FDA/Government has a moral obli-
gation, and therefore an equitable responsibility, to recompense manufacturers
and producers for losses due to adverse and erroneous publicity. Of course, the
general applicability of this holding may be somewhat limited by just how erro-
neous the FDA's publicity activity was in this case, or just how direct a cause
they were to the plaintis damages. For example, the court found that the
FDA's publicity was purely informational and not necessary to the regulatory
action of recalling cyclamates from the marketplace some 10 months after the
rst announcements; that the statements were incorrect and without support at
the time they were being made and not simply found to be erroneous later on;
and that the statements by the FDA were the direct cause of the manufacturer's
drop in sales.72
Unfortunately, two years later, recovery was denied to the manufacturer/canner.73
A reviewing panel found that, in fact, the s statements were not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or lacking in support,74 and that the plainti had not shown a connection
between the statements and the damage amounts claimed. Consequently, since
there was no wrongdoing on the part of government ocials and employees the
essential ingredient for a recommendation of an
711d. at 93.
72I~ at 90-93.
73Cal~fornia Canners & Growers Assn. v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 774
(1986).
~~Id at 784.
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27equitable award to plainti is lacking,75 and the equitable award/recovery was
denied. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the manufacturer was ultimately
denied recovery on mostly factual grounds, this case does suggest that the
FDA/Government can be morally and therefore legally responsible for recom-
pensing a manufacturer's losses that were due to adverse and erroneous FDA
publicity.
VIII. In Defense of FDA Use of Publicity
Firstly, to be fair, one should recognize that much of the publicity associated
with the FDA is not FDA-generated, and that the FDA does not necessarily
use publicity freely and indiscriminately, for every little thing that comes along.
The FDA actually seeks publicity, for example through press releases, less than
fty times a year.76 The remainder of the publicity stories about the FDA and
the products it regulates are initiated through other sources, mainly because of
the great public interest in the safety of products regulated by the FDA. The
character and amount of publicity is largely controlled by the press or other
media. Rarely is a news release printed in its original form.
Furthermore, the FDA recognizes and believes that a majority of persons de-
sire to comply with the law and will comply voluntarily when given information
as to what is required and what violations appear to exist. Thus, the FDA nec-
essarily relies on voluntary industry self-regulation and compliance (including
recalls initiated by the manufacturers themselves), and it is FDA
751d at 785.
76Wayne L. Pines (Deputy Asst. Commissioner for Public Aairs of the
Food and Drug Administration), Regulatory Letters, Publicity and Recalls, 31
Food Drug Cosm. L..1 352, 354 (1976).
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28policy that responsible persons be given notice of violations and aorded an
opportunity for correction.77 In reality, the use of publicity is mainly reserved
for situations in which a company refuses to recall a product after a request by
the FDA, often in conjunction with seizure and injunction actions, or when a
recall may not be suciently comprehensive or eective to protect the public (as
discussed earlier). And remember, publicity is really the only eective way to
remove from the marketplace those dangerous products that reach the consumer
and are beyond tracing through the normal distribution system. Therefore,
one should recognize that the FDA's use of publicity is often in reaction to
dangerous and even emergency situations created by others, and is not a pre-
planned devise.
In fact, it is in the FDA's interest to use publicity judiciously. It is only
by a careful use of publicity and attention to statements and allegations made
that the FDA avoids locking itself into a position well in advance of adjudica-
tory ndings.78 For example, FDA decisions to proceed with prosecution are
cleared through several levels of review, each with a negative veto over the de-
cision to exercise prosecutorial discretion in that particular case. Premature
or position-locking publicity disrupts the process and contradicts the agency's
interest in picking strong cases and pursuing them.79 Moreover, ill-advised or
rash announcements (or denouncements), like the cranberry scare statements,
will only hurt the agency's credibility if and when they are discovered to be
erroneous, whether or not the agency was justied in making
771d
785ee, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d
583 (DC Cir.
1970).
795ee 42 FR 12436 (Mar. 4, 1977), FDA proposed publicity policy.
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29them. The FDA also know[s] what happened to the boy who cried 'adulterated'
too often. He got himself and his message 'adulterated.'80 So they recognize,
too, that the issuance of too many public wamings would simply lessen the
impact of a public waming about a serious health hazard.8' Additionally, the
Secretary is a politician, and as a politician he is also sensitive to and cannot
ignore the pressures of interest groups and other politicians, who may not prefer
drastic, polarized actions. Finally, there is always the presence of the options
of last resort, removal by the President82 and impeachment,83 to temper the
Secretary's use of publicity.
Of course, the FDA does have a large range of other enforcement and reg-
ulatory tools available, potential alternatives that some may prefer over the
FDA's informal and unregulated use of adverse publicity. These include recalls,
seizures, and injunctions, traditionally the FDA's primary regulatory and en-
forcement tools, as well as criminal prosecution, waming letters, license suspen-
sion and revocation, and withdrawal of product approvals. However, it is often
not eective or practical to use these other forms. For example, while many
violations could be prosecuted as criminal matters, it would not be responsible,
or perhaps even possible, to do so in every case. Also, a criminal prosecution
or ne, for example, provides small consolation to a patient who has suered
injury or even death from an unsafe or ineective food, drug, or medical device.
Because of its comprehensive distribution and the lack of agency labor needed,
publicity is simply one of the most eective and ecient regulatory tools that
the FDA has.
80Pines, 31 Food Drug Cosm. L. Ji. at 354.
81I~
825ee Myers v. US., 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
83U.S. Constitution, Art. II, Sec.4
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30The eectiveness and eciency that the use of publicity provides are not only
practical advantages, but, in the case of a resource-strapped agency like the
FDA, are necessities. It is well known that the scope of the FDA's duties
severely strain its limited resources. The FDA has approximately 3,900 per-
sonnel involved in enforcement and surveillance activities.84 However, the FDA
must regulate: approximately 90,000 domestic establishments engaged in the
manufacturing, processing, repacking, relabeling, or wholesale storage of vari-
ous articles; the quality and integrity of research done by 20,000 clinical inves-
tigators of food, drugs, devices, and biologics; and the safety of one and a half
million import entries each year.85 In addition, during a typical year, the FDA
will inspect approximately 20,000 establishments, analyze 29,500 samples, and
issue 8,000 notices of inspectional ndings. The FDA then issues 1,500 warning
letters, monitors 2,000 recalls, and initiates 200 seizures, 20 injunctions, and 40
prosecutions.86 Understanding the sheer scope and number of FDA activities,
one may better appreciate the benet from and the vital need for any regulatory
tool that is eective and can save on limited resources.
Finally, one must remember that, ultimately, the FDA' s mission is to protect
the public health and to promote honesty and fair dealing in the marketplace,87
and it will do almost anything within its authority, and will even push the
envelope of its authority, to do so. Of
84As of 1992; See Alan L. Hoeting, The FDA's Enforcement Program, 47
Food & Drug L.J 405, 406 (1992).
85I~
86Id at 407.
87lncluded in the 1935 U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce report entitled
Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics, S. Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)
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31course, there are times when the decision is tough, when uncertainty about a
danger and the threat to public safety from that potential danger, are nearly
balanced. However, the decision always must be made in favor of consumer
protection. '~88 After all, the innocent consumer should not be made the vic-
tim....in order to protect the innocent producer.89 Alternatively, one may point
out that it is the right of the public to know about the dangers that the FDA
is aware of, and it is the duty of the FDA to disclose them. Indeed, the Gov-
ernment has no right to withhold from its citizens information about situations
or products which may endanger the public health.90 Remember, it is only in
hindsight that many incidents involving FDA use of publicity seem unjustied.
IX. Solutions to the Adverse Publicity Dilemma
Although the situation seems insoluble at times, there are several suggested
measures that can be taken in response to the adverse publicity problem.
First, we should consider amending the Federal Tort Claims Act to include
claims for damages arising from acts of libel, slander, or misrepresentation by
federal agencies. One commentator has focused on streamlining and system-
atizing the government's obligation to
88Stated in a FDA press release retracting the Stokely-Van Camp botulism
false alarm, cited in Morey, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L. Ji at 477.
89Testimony of Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Arthur Flem-
ming, Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 7624, 63-69 (1960).
90Testimony of Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Arthur Flem-
ming, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Departments of Labor and Health,
Education and Welfare and RelatedAgencies of the House Committee on Appro-
priations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 165-190, 777 (1960).
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32pay.9' Currently, the costs of providing justice and fair compensation to victims
of agency mistakes are too high. However, revisions could provide compensation,
but leave still leave upon the claimant the burden of showing that publicity was
directed at the claimant, was uncorrected, and was either materially erroneous,
substantially misleading, or clearly excessive. Issues of causation and damage
also remain part of the claimant's burden of proof.92 A heavier burden of proof
would help deter frivolous claims against the government.
It only makes sense that the government should compensate those innocent
companies that are injured by adverse FDA publicity. When the public gets the
benet of a program, the public should pay for the torts that may be expected
in carrying out the program.93 Also, this option would not unduly burden the
FDA or limit its discretion in using publicity to protect the public. However,
even if this type of recovery were allowed, it is unlikely that the aected party
could be compensated for its entire loss, a loss which includes intangible assets
such as reputation and goodwill.
Another potential solution of note is to amend the Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act to provide the FDA with statutory recall authority. Given the connection
between the FDA's use of the recall and its use of publicity to help bolster its
recall requests and eorts,94 granting the FDA the
91Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
1380,
1437-40 (1973).
92Id
93Davis, 3 Administrative Law Sec. 26.07 (1958).
945ee Section I on how publicity is used, supra.
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33power to order recalls might change the dynamics of this situation95 and reduce
the FDA's reliance on publicity, and therefore its adverse eects on manufac-
turers.
Finally, we should seriously reconsider limitations on the circumstances in
which agency publicity would be issued. Of course, this process of agency self-
examination and revision began when the FDA set out to publish the agency's
publicity policy and proposed publicity regulations in 1977.96 However, it was
discontinued when the FDA withdrew its proposed regulations some 14 years
later, before they were ever nalized.97 Therefore, a serious eort should now
be made to (re)implement the Administrative Conference's ndings and recom-
mendations, and the regulations adopted by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare.98 Specically, a minimal period of advance notice should
be adopted, perhaps 30 days for normal notice and 24 hours minimum notice,
such as that provided by the Toxic Substances Control Act.99 This would allow
any respondent a reasonable opportunity to prepare in advance a response to
the publicity about to be released. In addition, all adverse publicity should
be factual in content and accurate in description. Disparaging terminology not
essential to the content and purpose of the publicity should be avoided.'00 This
will help eliminate the possibility of libel, slander, and, to a certain extent, mis-
representation. Finally, among other things, the FDA should issue retractions
or
95Morey, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. at 471.
965ee earlier discussion of agency policy and 42 FR 12436 (Mar. 4, 1977).
975ee 56 FR 67740 (Dec. 30, 1991).
9845 C.F.R. xx17.1 et seq.
10045 C.F.R. x 17.2
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34corrections in the same manner as the original publicity, if the aected party
requests it and shows the publicity to have been erroneous or misleading. This
would be a sort of statutory corrective publicity, a simpler, cheap (low-resource),
and readily available remedy for the eects of erroneous adverse publicity.
X. Conclusion
Ultimately, the problem of the use of adverse publicity by the FDA boils
down to one single issue: how does one balance the need to protect the pub-
lic's health and safety from potential dangers with the need to protect innocent
companies and individuals from potential publicity-induced harm? Considering
the pervasive uncertainty that is inherent in attempting to ascertain the poten-
tialities of both these types of dangers, as well as the severe degree of physical
and economic harm involved, this question cannot be answered to any one per-
son's satisfaction. Given the FDA's policy and its commitment to its overriding
mission of protecting the public, it is unlikely that the FDA will ever give up
its use of publicity as a regulatory tool. Perhaps in the future, the agency will
once again revive its interest in establishing a publicity policy and propose reg-
ulations. One thing is certain. As the trend of increasing governmental activity
in protecting the public continues and agencies expand their jurisdictions and
duties into new areas, the problem of adverse publicity will become ever more
important.
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